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Mark & Connie Schellerup3

The complaint was amended multiple times. Each iteration of the complaint added
and/or removed plaintiffs without explanation. The Appellants' Brief appears to name as
appellants those persons who were named as plaintiffs in the proposed Fifth Amended
Complaint.
2
Mark Warner was named as a plaintiff in the Second Amended Complaint (R. at 4 77),
but was not named as a plaintiff in the proposed Fifth Amended Complaint (R. at 2568)
and was not named as an appellant in the Appellants' Brief.
3
The Schellerups were named as plaintiffs in the original Complaint, First Amended
Complaint, Second Amended Complaint, Third Amended Complaint, and Fourth
Amended Complaint (R. at 2, 29, 4 77, 1318), but were not named as plaintiffs in the
proposed Fifth Amended Complaint (R. at 2568) and were not named as appellants.
1
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Defendants/Appellees4
Robert Brazell
In Store Broadcasting Network, LLC
In Store Broadcasting Holdings, LLC
IBN Media, LLC,
In Touch LLC
In Touch Media LLC
Talos Partners, LLC
Von H. Whitby
Robert W. Kasten Jr.
Robert E. Riley
Robin N ebels
Rob WolP
Mark Oleksik6
Joel Ballstaedt7

4

The named defendants also varied in the iterations of the complaint.
Rob Wolf was named as a defendant in the First Amended Complaint and the proposed
Fifth Amended Complaint (R. at 30, 2569), but was not named as an appellee in the
Appellants' Brief.
6
Mark Oleksik was named as a defendant in the Second Amended Complaint (R. at 4 78),
but was not named as a defendant in the proposed Fifth Amended Complaint (R. at 2569)
and was not named as an appellee in the Appellants' Brief.
7 Joel Ballstaedt was named as a defendant in the Third Amended Complaint and the
proposed Fifth Amended Complaint (R. at 1320, 2570), but was not listed as an appellee
in the Appellants' Brief.
5
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I.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).
II.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The plaintiffs/appellants are a fluctuating group of individuals and entities
(hereinafter, the "Plaintiffs") who allegedly invested the "In-Store Broadcasting" entities
in 2006 and 2007 and who asserted fraud claims in 2013 arising out of their alleged
investment. After almost two years of litigation and multiple amendments to the
Plaintiffs' complaint, several defendants (the "IBN Defendants") sought dismissal on the
grounds that the operative complaint failed to plead its claims with the requisite
particularity; Defendant Von H. Whitby (hereinafter "Whitby") joined in this motion. In
response, the Plaintiffs declined to defend their complaints, instead seeking leave to file a
proposed Fifth Amended Complaint. Finding that the proposed Fifth Amended
Complaint was untimely, prejudicial, unjustified, and futile, the trial court correctly
denied leave to amend and dismissed the undefended prior versions.
The issues on appeal are as follows:
Issue 1: Whether the Plaintiffs' appellate brief should be stricken and the appeal

dismissed for the lack of any citation to the record below.
Issue 2: Whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying leave

to file a proposed Fifth Amended Complaint based on the detennination that the proposed
amendment was untimely, prejudicial, and unjustified.
Standard of Review: The denial of leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. Turville v. J & J Prop., LLC, 2006 UT App 305, ,I 23, 145 P.3d 1146.
1

Issue 3: Whether the trial court correctly denied leave to amend for futility when
it detennined that the Plaintiffs' proposed Fifth Amended Complaint failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted in that it failed to plead fraud-based claims with
the requisite particularity.
Standard of Review: A denial of leave to amend for futility where a complaint
would not survive a motion to dismiss is reviewed for correctness. Nelson v. Target

Corp., 2014 UT App 205, ,r 12,334 P.3d 1010.
Issue 4: Whether the trial court's decision can be affirmed on the alternative
grounds that the Plaintiffs failed to adequately make or supplement the initial disclosures
required by Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Issue 5: Whether the trial court's decision can be affirmed, at least in part, as to
Whitby on the alternative grounds that the Plaintiffs conceded that their Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act claim against Whitby should be dismissed.

III.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
RULES, AND REGULATIONS
The following Rules are attached as Addendum B: Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

9, 15, and 26.
IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This case concerns the obligations of all plaintiffs to adequately plead and

prosecute their claims. Because Utah law is clear that (1) a trial court has considerable
discretion to pennit or deny leave to amend and (2) a party asserting fraud-based claims

2
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must plead such claims with sufficient particularity as to allow the defendants to
@

understand the nature of the claims and defend against them, this Court can resolve the
issues on appeal on the grounds that the Plaintiffs failed in each of their successive
complaints - including their proposed Fifth Amended Complaint - to meet the
requirements of Rule 9(b). In addition, because the Utah rules are clear as a party's
affirmative disclosure obligations, this Court can resolve the issues on appeal on the
alternative grounds that the Plaintiffs failed to properly disclose their witnesses and
damages during fact discovery as required by Rule 26.

B.
Ci

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings

The Plaintiffs' Complaints and Stipulation as to Whitby
1.

The Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint in this action on February 1,

2013. (R. at 1.) On April 1, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint.
(R. at 27.)
2.

Whitby was served with the First Amended Complaint and a Sununons on

April 23, 2013. (R. at 2859-61.)
3.

The first Defendant to answer the Plaintiffs' Complaint was Rob Wolf, who

filed his Answer on June 3, 2013. (R. at 106.)
4.

Because the Plaintiffs did not consider Whitby a primary target of the

litigation, they agreed that Whitby need not respond to the operative complaint until
twenty days (20) days after each of the other Defendants had been served. (R. at 2863.)

3

5.

Even after the ·Plaintiffs substituted counsel, the agreement regarding

Whitby's open-ended extension on responding to the operative complaint and Whitby's
service of initial disclosures was confinned by the Plaintiffs' new counsel. (R. at 2865.)
6.

On or about September 3, 2013, seven (7) months after filing their original

Complaint, the Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint. (R. at 476-93.)
7.

According to the Court's Notice and based on the first filed Answer, fact

discovery was to be completed by February 18, 2014. (R. at 125-26.)
8.

On or about March 6, 2014, more than one year after filing suit, the

Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint, apparently without leave of Court. (R. at
1316-37.)
9.

In May 2014, the Plaintiffs unilaterally revoked their prior stipulation and

demanded a response to the complaint from Whitby. (R. at 2871.)
10.

On May 29, 2014, Whitby filed his Answer to the Third Amended

Complaint. (R. at 1867-77.)
11.

On July 3, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed their Fourth Amended Complaint

without leave of Court. (R. at 2024-47.) On July 18, 2014, Whitby filed an Answer to
the Fourth Amended Complaint, subject to and without waiving his objection that the
Fourth Amended Complaint was filed without leave of Court and without Whitby's
consent. (R. at 2126-3 7 .)
12.

In its September 16, 2014 Minute Entry, the trial court recognized that the

Fourth Amended Complaint was filed without the court's leave, stating that "Defendant

4

correctly points out that no order authorized the filing of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
Until such order is made, no answer or other response is required." (R. at 2389.)

The Plaintiffs' Deficient Initial Disclosures
13.

On September 10, 2013, more than seven (7) months after filing their

original complaint, The Plaintiffs served initial disclosures. (R. at 2875-82.) The
Plaintiffs' initial disclosures include a list of fifty-five (55) potential witnesses. However,
the Plaintiffs did not include any subjects of information or any summary of anticipated
testimony with respect to any of these witnesses, not even with respect to the Plaintiffs
themselves. (R. at 2876-78.)
14.

Further, the Plaintiffs' initial disclosures did not include any information

regarding a computation of damages, instead stating only that:
an exact computation of damages suffered by Plaintiffs, including lost
profits, legal fees and costs incurred in connection with bringing The
Plaintiffs' claims, cannot be determined until such time as the Court
adjudicates the existing claims.
(R. at 2879.) The Plaintiffs claimed that "attached hereto is a list of each Plaintiffs
@

amount invested with the Defendants, which forms a portion of the damages," but
nothing was attached. (Id.)
15.

On or about May 28, 2014, more than fifteen (15) months after filing their

initial complaint, the Plaintiffs served supplemental disclosures. (R. at 2884-88.) The
Plaintiffs' supplemental disclosures did not include any additional information regarding
potential witnesses, nor any additional documents. The Plaintiffs' supplemental
disclosures purported to provide damages infonnation, but stated only that the Plaintiffs

5

"will be making claims for damage against the defendants of at least $40,000,000.00
excluding exemplary damages." (Id.) The supplemental disclosure includes no
computation of how that $40 million figure was derived. (Id.)
16.

At a July 16, 2014 hearing, the trial court admonished the Plaintiffs to

provide appropriate initial disclosures, warning the Plaintiffs that any testimony that was
not fairly disclosed would be excluded. (R. at 2890-92.)
17.

On August 6, 2014, the Plaintiffs served their Consolidated Second

Supplemental Initial Disclosures. (R. at 2894-905.) In their second supplemental
disclosures, the Plaintiffs identified fifty-five (55) Plaintiffs (or the Plaintiffs'
representatives). (Id. at 2900-03.) These individuals would apparently each offer the
same testimony. (Id. at 2899-900.)
18.

In the Plaintiffs' second supplemental disclosures, the only anticipated

testimony with respect to Whitby is that he and others "indicated in correspondence and
otherwise that they were or are officers, directors and or managers of the Defendant
entities." (R. at 2900.) Apparently, all fifty-four (54) Plaintiffs will provide that same
testimony. (Id.) Aside from this statement, the second supplemental disclosures are
silent with respect to Whitby. (See generally, id.)
19.

The Plaintiffs did not serve any documents with their August 6, 2014

second supplemental disclosures. (R. at 2894-905.)
20.

The Plaintiffs' second supplemental disclosures did not provide any

additional infonnation regarding damages. (R. at 2894-905.)
21.

The Plaintiffs did not otherwise supplement their initial disclosures.
6

Motions to Dismiss, Motion for Summa1y Judgment, and Memorandum Decision

22.

On October 29, 2014, the IBN Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. (R. at

2419-41.) Whitby joined the motion. (R. at 2475-77.)
23.

On November 21, 2014, the IBN Defendants also filed a Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action (securities fraud) based on the 5-year statue of repose in
the Utah Uniform Securities Act. (R. at 2514-25.) Whitby also joined in this motion.
(R. at 2547-48.)
24.

On December 3, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed their memorandum in opposition

to the IBN Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (R. at 2646-60.) Although they styled their
@

response an "Opposition," "[r]ather than defend their amended complaints, regardless of
which one is before the Court, the Plaintiffs have chosen to seek leave to file an amended
complaint." (R. at 2649.)

@

25.

On December 3, 2014, the Plaintiffs also filed a Motion for Leave to File

Amended Complaint (and a supporting memorandum the following day) in which they
sought leave to file their proposed Fifth Amended Complaint. (R. at 2561-640; 2685-92.)
26.

On December 17, 2014, Whitby filed his memorandum in opposition to the

Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend. (R. at 2743-99.)
27.

On December 17, 2014, Whitby also filed a motion for summary judgment

as to all claims against him. (R. at 2814-52.)
28.

On December 29, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed their reply memorandum in

support of their motion for leave to amend. (R. at 3068-259) The Plaintiffs' pejorative
Introduction read as follows:
7

Brazell, Whitby and Kasten, using their individual and corporate identities,
are nothing more than twenty-first century bandits willing to say anything
to avoid the truth being known about them and the justice that will result
from that truth.
(R. at 3069.)
29.

On January 5, 2014, the trial court heard oral argument on the Defendants' two

motions to dismiss and the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend. (R. at 5570-615.)
30.

On January 15, 2015, the Plaintiffs filed their opposition to Whitby's

motion for summary judgment. (R. at 3321-84.) In their opposition, the Plaintiffs
conceded that Whitby was entitled to summary judgment on the "constructive trust,"
"fraudulent transfer," "derivative action," and "request for receivership" claims set forth
in the Fourth Amended Complaint and Proposed Fifth Amended Complaint. (R. at
3382.)
31.

On January 22, 2015, the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision,

denying the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend and dismissing each of the Plaintiffs'
various complaints. (R. at 3594-600.)
32.

In light of the trial court's Memorandum Decision, Whitby filed a

"Suggestion ofMootness" regarding his motion for summary judgment rather than a
reply memorandum and his motion for summary judgment was never submitted to or
considered by the trial court. (R. at 3601-04.)

VI.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Where fraud is alleged, defendants have a right to a particularized pleading
explaining, at a minimum, the "who, what, when, where, and how" of the alleged

8

misrepresentations.· This allows each defendant to fonnulate his or her individual
@

defenses. In this case, for example, Whitby was a manager of one or more defendant
entities, but only at certain periods of time, and long after the Plaintiffs made their
investments. Probably for this reason, the Plaintiffs did not treat Whitby as a primary
target: the Plaintiffs stipulated that Whitby need not respond to the complaint until after
all Defendants had been served, and this stipulation remained in place for a full year until
it was unilaterally revoked by the Plaintiffs (despite the fact that all Defendants had still
not been served).
After almost two years of litigation and multiple versions of their complaint,

i>

however, the Plaintiffs still had not stated with any particularity what misrepresentations
of fact were said to whom, by whom, and when, and how, and (of particular importance
with respect to Whitby) what Whitby's purported involvement had been in any such
representations. Faced with a motion to dismiss, the Plaintiffs abandoned their prior
iterations of the complaint, instead relying entirely on a proposed Fifth Amended
Complaint which still could not explain what purported misrepresentations were made by
whom, to which Plaintiff, and when, and how each Plaintiff relied. Carefully reviewing
this proposed complaint, the trial court determined that not only was it untimely,
prejudicial, and unjustified, it still failed to plead fraud with the requisite particularity
demanded by Rule 9(b). As the trial comi succinctly held, "[s]ix tries at pleading fraud
are enough." (R. at 3598.)

.

There are additional reasons to affinn. Not only did the Plaintiffs fail to
adequately plead their claims, they failed to make proper disclosures under Rule 26,
9

failing to disclose any anticipated testimony implicating Whitby and failing to disclose
their computation of damages. And, in response to Whitby's motion for summary
judgment, the Plaintiffs conceded that their Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act claim
should be dismissed.
The Plaintiffs have ignored their obligations under the Rules at every tum,
including, as the latest example, their failure to cite the record in their appellate brief.
Accordingly, the appeal should be dismissed and the trial court affinned.

VII.
A.

ARGUMENT

THE PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO CITE THE RECORD BELOW.
As set forth in the brief of the IBN Defendants, which arguments are adopted

herein pursuant to Rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Appellants' Brief
should be stricken and the appeal dismissed for the Plaintiffs' failure to cite to the record.
The rules are clear, as is the precedent authorizing dismissal. The Plaintiffs have
"dump[ed] the burden or their argument and research" on this Court, see Andersen v.

Andersen, 2015 UT App 260, ,r 6, 361 P.3d 698, and the Appellants' Brief should be
stricken and the appeal dismissed on this basis alone.

B.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED LEA VE TO AMEND.
Even if the Court were to consider the Plaintiffs' non-compliant appellate brief,

the trial court's decision should be affin11ed. The Plaintiffs do not challenge the trial
court's dismissal of each of their complaints up to and including the Fourth Amended
Complaint. Accordingly, this appeal hinges on the trial court's denial of the Plaintiffs'
motion for leave to file their proposed Fifth Amended Complaint. As the Plaintiffs
10

concede, denial of leave to amend is reviewed under the "abuse of discretion" standard.
@

(See Appellants' Br. at 2.)

The trial court, in its thorough and well-reasoned Memorandum Decision,
correctly determined that the proposed Fifth Amended Complaint was untimely,
prejudicial, and unjustified. (See R. at 3595.) Moreover, the trial court detennined that
amendment would be futile as the proposed Fifth Amended Complaint failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. (See R. at 3594-600.) Specifically, it failed to
plead the Plaintiffs' claims with the particularity required by Rule 9(b ). In this regard,
the trial court made specific reference to Whitby, observing:
Defendant Whitby's joinder in the Motion illustrates this problem. It is
impossible to tell from the Fifth Amended Complaint when Whitby
supposedly joined Plaintiffs' posited conspiracy, and which Plaintiff relied
on any representation with which he might possibly be charged. No
allegation is made of any representation actually made by him. As Whitby
pointed out in argument, he has factual defenses to make based on when he
came to the company, so each plaintiff needs to explain what representation
they relied on as to which that they can properly claim Whitby is
accountable .... Rule 9(b) is essential in such as case; Whitby is entitled to
the specifics of each plaintifrs claim against him, without being lumped
together with every other defendant, defending the lumped-together claims
of every plaintiff.
(R. at 3596-97.)
On appeal, the Plaintiffs do not challenge the trial court's application of Rule 9(b)
to their claims (except as to their UFTA claim, addressed below). Moreover, the
Plaintiffs largely ignore the trial court's reasoning and analysis as to futility, making only
the conclusory assertion that they "set forth the 'who, what, when, where, and how'" of
their claims, but failing to identify with any specificity where in the proposed Fifth

11

Amended Complaint such questions are answered as to any particular Plaintiff, any
particular Defendant, or any particular misrepresentation. (See Appellants' Br. at 25-26.)
Thus, the Plaintiffs have dumped upon the trial court and now upon this Court the burden
of sifting through the alleged facts to ascertain whether Plaintiffs have alleged facts
necessary to make all their elements of their claims. See Coro/es v. Sabey, 2003 UT App
339, iJ 27, 79 P.3d 974. This approach is "unacceptable." Id.
Pursuant to Rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Whitby adopts by
reference the arguments of the IBN Defendants as to the correctness of the trial court's
denial of leave to amend. The trial court's decision should be affirmed.

C.

ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS FOR AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT.
The trial court's decision should also be affirmed on alternative grounds. It is

well-settled that an appellate court may affinn the judgment appealed from
if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record,
even though such ground differs from that stated by the trial court to be the
basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or
theory ... was not considered or passed on by the lower court.
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ilil 10, 13, 52 P.3d 1158 (affinning court of appeals in
affirming trial court's order on alternative grounds) (quoting Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001
UT 61, iJ 18, 29 P.3d 1225).
1.

The Plaintiffs Failed to Meet Their Disclosure Obligations.

As is apparent on the record, the Plaintiffs' claims also fail for their failure to
make, during fact discovery, the requisite disclosures for the presentation of their case-inchief. Under Rule 26, the Plaintiffs were required to provide, as part of their initial

12
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disclosures, the name of each individual likely to have discoverable infonnation
@

supporting their claims and each fact witness they may call in their case-in-chief with a
"summary of the expected testimony." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(A). In addition, the
Plaintiffs were required to provide "a computation of any damages claimed and a copy of
all discoverable documents or evidentiary material on which such computation is based."
Id. at 26(a)(l)(C).

Rule 26(d)( 4) provides that a party's failure to submit timely disclosures precludes
that party from using the undisclosed evidence, unless the failure is harmless or the party
shows good cause for the failure. Id. at 26(d)(4). Regarding initial disclosures, the
commentary to Rule 26 explains:
The penalty for failing to make timely disclosures is that the evidence may
not be used in the party's case-in-chief. To make the disclosure
requirement meaningful, and to discourage sandbagging, parties must
know that if they fail to disclose important information that is helpful
to their case, they will not be able to use that information at trial. The
courts will be expected to enforce them unless the failure is harmless or the
party shows good cause for the failure.
Id. at R. 26, Advisory Committee Notes (emphasis added).

Here, the Plaintiffs had the affinnative obligation to disclose any testimony and
documents they intended to present to establish their claims. Moreover, the trial court
specifically warned the Plaintiffs that without an adequate description of witness
testimony, their witnesses would be precluded from testifying. (R. at 2890-92.) Even in
the face of this warning, the Plaintiffs failed to disclose any testimony or documents
which demonstrate liability. The Plaintiffs completely failed to provide any facts which
set forth a single representation by Whitby to any Plaintiff, much less a
13

misrepresentation, much less one on which any Plaintiff relied to its detriment. This
failure is fatal to their claims. And, the Plaintiffs had plenty of time to make the requisite

@

disclosures: based on the presumptive 210-day period found in Rule 26(c), fact discovery
closed in February 2014, long before the trial court's dismissal. (See R. at 125-26)
Further, the Plaintiffs' failure to make an adequate disclosure of their damages
computation is fatal to each of their claims. With respect to the disclosure of damages
information, the Rule 26 commentary explains that "[p ]arties should make a good faith
attempt to compute damages to the extent it is possible to do so and must in any event
provide all discoverable infonnation on the subject, including materials related to the
nature and extent of the damages." Utah R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory Cmmnittee Notes. The
Plaintiffs did nothing more than pull a $40 million dollar number out of the air without
any support or explanation or any discernible relationship to the allegations and claims.
(R. at 2884-88.) Thus, having failed to disclose a computation of damages, the Plaintiffs
would be precluded from presenting evidence of damages, and their claims-whether
under the proposed Fifth Amended Complaint or any prior complaint-would fail. The
trial court' dismissal should be affirmed on this alternative basis.

2.

The Plaintiffs Conceded That They Have No UFTA Claim Against
Whitby.

The Plaintiffs' proposed Fifth Amended Complaint added four causes of action:
"Constructive Trust," "Fraudulent Transfer," "Derivative Action," and "Request for
Receivership." (R. at 2634-37.) The trial court denied the Motion to Amend as to these
claims "without regard to futility" and on the grounds that they were untimely, without
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justification, and unduly prejudicial. (R. at 3598-99.) Apparently ignoring this portion of
@)

the trial court's decision, the Plaintiffs make the ironic claim that the trial court "ignored"
their Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA") claim and argue that the trial court
incorrectly applied Rule 9(b) to their UFTA claim. 1 (See Appellants' Br. at 26-28.) The
Plaintiffs' argument was not preserved and, in any event, lacks merit for the reasons set
forth in the IBN Defendants' brief, which reasons are adopted and incorporated herein.
In addition, the trial court's rejection of the Plaintiffs' UFTA claim should be
affirmed on alternative grounds as to Whitby. Whitby moved for summary judgment
arguing, inter alia, that the Plaintiffs' newly-added claims should be dismissed as a
matter oflaw. (R. at 2814-52.) In response, the Plaintiffs conceded summary judgment
on their late-filed claims, including their UFTA claim. (R. at 3382.) Although the trial
court issued its Memorandum Decision before briefing on Whitby's summary judgment
motion was complete, the Plaintiffs' concession of judgment stands on the record and
provides an alternative basis for this Court to affirm the trial court's decision.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

Whitby respectfully asks this Court to strike the Appellants' Brief and dismiss the
appeal or, in the alternative, to affinn the trial court's order denying leave to amend and
ti

dismissing the Plaintiffs' complaints with prejudice.

1

The Plaintiffs do not challenge the trial court's rejection of the other three new claims.
15

DATED this 11th day of March, 2016.

BURBIDGE MITCHELL & GROSS

S. Ian Hiatt
Attorneys for Appellee Von H. Whitby.
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ADDENDUM A

FIL~I DIITRICT CIUIT
Third Judicial District

JAN 22 20J5
av

SALT LAKE-~

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _....:,_..;~:.l-llAll&ll-ttCJerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE ARMER TEXAS TRUST (AKA TEXAS ARMER
TRUST), ET AL,
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs,
Civil No.

130900740

-vsJudge Andrew Stone

ROBERT V. BRAZELL, IN-STORE BROADCASTING
NETWORK, LLC, IN-STORE BROADCASTING
HOLDING, LLC, IBN MEDIA, LLC, INTOUCH, LLC,
INTOUCH MEDIA, LLC, TALOS PARTNERS, LLC,
VON WHITBY, ROBERT W. KASTEN JR., ROBERT
E. RILEY, ROBIN NEBEL, ROB WOLF, MARK
OLEKSIK, and DOES 1-15,

Defendants.

This case comes before the court on the motion of Defendants Robert V. Brazell, Robert W.
Kasten Jr., In-Store Broadcasting Network, LLC, In-Store Broadcasting Holding, LLC, Talos
Partners, LLC, IBN Media, LLC, lnTouch Media, LLC and lnTouch, LLC (collectively, "IBN
Defendants") to dismiss all of Plaintiffs' Causes of Action under Rule 12(b)(6). These Defendants
assert that the complaint fails to state a claim under the standards of Rule 9(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant Von Whitby joins their motion. These same IBN Defendants
move as well to dismiss the First Cause of Action as time barred. Defendants Von Whitby and
Robert Riley join in this motion.
Plaintiffs respond to the 12(b)(6) motion by seeking leave to file a Fifth Amended Complaint.
1
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•

This case was filed in February, 2013. Plaintiffs amended their original complaint before an
answer was filed and later obtained leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. Thereafter, the
parties stipulated in January 2014 that amended pleadings could be filed up to July 3, 2014. The
Court never approved this stipulation. However, pursuant to that stipulation Plaintiffs filed a
Third Amended and a Fourth Amended Complaint within the time agreed in the stipulation.
After that time had passed, Defendants made the present motion. Plaintiffs sought leave to file
the Fifth Amended Complaint on December 4, 2014.
Thus, the operative Complaint is actually the Second Amended Complaint, the last iteration as
to which leave was granted for filing pursuant to the Rules. However, the reality is that Plaintiffs
have relied on a stipulation permitting the filing of amendments without leave in filing the Third
and Fourth Amended Complaints. The Court, therefore, would ordinarily base its analysis of the
adequacy of the pleadings on those later filed papers. However, the filing of the Motion to
Amend (pertaining to the proposed Fifth Amended Complaint) necessitates that the Court
resolve that motion first-the Court declines to simply evaluate the earlier filed versions and
dismiss with prejudice, given the filing of the Motion to Amend.
In so doing, the Court does not accept Plaintiffs' argument that they are entitled to this new
amendment because Defendants have not previously objected to the particularity of the
previous complaints. Each of the answers filed interposed a defense that the applicable
complaint failed to state a cause of action. Rule 9(b) applies from the start, and does not merely
contemplate an automatic ''do-over" if a defendant raises particularity. Rather, the Court first
addresses the Motion to Amend because Plaintiffs acknowledge it contains greater particularity
than the earlier versions-thus, if the Fifth Amended Complaint still fails in particularity,
consideration of the other complaints becomes unnecessary. On the other hand, if leave to
amend is granted, the present Motion is moot with respect to earlier versions of the Complaint.
The Court denies the Motion to Amend. The Complaint is untimely, coming long after both the
Court-imposed presumptive deadline for amendment as well as that stipulated to by the
parties. Amendment at this point would substantially prejudice defendants as they would now
be faced with new factual theories for which they have not had time to prepare. In addition,
Plaintiffs offer no justification for not having pleaded their multiple earlier versions of the
complaint with the additional facts offered in the Fifth Amended Complaint-all of the facts
regarding supposed misrepresentations and Plaintiffs' reliance thereon were plainly available to
them from the start. Most significantly, the Court has determined that the proposed
amendment would be futile. In so doing, the Court has carefully reviewed the proposed Fifth
Amended Complaint and concludes that it still fails to plead a fraud claim as to any specific
plaintiff against any specific defendant with the particularity required by Rule 9(b).
2
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I

The proposed Fifth Amended Complaint is long on narrative and short on specifics with respect
to each individual party. It does not explain when any false representation was made to any
individual plaintiff, or any plaintiff's specific reliance on that statement. It fails to explain when
each plaintiff obtained their respective shares or otherwise relied on statements by defendants.
Fraud-based claims are highly individualized, because reliance is an individual decision.
Accordingly, stating a particularized claim of fraud requires each plaintiff to allege which
representations were made to them, when and how and by whom, and how they each relied on
that representation. This permits each of the defendants to defend against the allegation as to
each defendant and each plaintiff. The Fifth Amended Complaint does not permit any one
defendant to determine which supposed misrepresentation of fact was relied on by which
plaintiff in what way, and why each defendant should be charged with that alleged
misrepresentation. Rule 9(b) requires that minimal pleading before permitting a party to cry
"fraud."
The proposed Fifth Amended Complaint alleges a long course of supposed misrepresentations,
mostly occurring in 2006-2007. Nearly all of them are statements of future intent, or opinions
as to value. A statement that an investment "is going to be huge" is not a statement of
presently existing fact. Statements of intent regarding future investments or their structure are
likewise not statements of presently existing fact. If such an intent was not genuinely held at
the time of the statement, it might constitute an implied misrepresentation of existing fact, but
the Fifth Amended Complaint makes no attempt to allege as much. Likewise a statement that
other investments "have been secured" or a statement of intent to put one's own money into
the venture is not false at the time merely because it did not ultimately happen. The Fifth
Amended Complaint simply glosses over this principle, conclusorily alleging misrepresentations
regarding forward-looking statements (and conveniently omitting any actual disclosure
documents given to the purchasers). tt is not too much to require plaintiffs to allege statements
of existing fact, that the facts represented were untrue at the time, and how plaintiffs relied to
their detriment on that misrepresentation. The Fifth Amended Complaint does not accomplish
this.
This is not a class action. Each plaintiff will have made individual decisions as to buying and
holding stock in this case. Each of the defendants played different roles. We are dealing with
separate fraud actions pursued by each proposed plaintiff against various defendants.
Particularity is required for each of these claims.
Defendant Whitby's joinder in the Motion illustrates this problem. It is impossible to tell from
the Fifth Amended Complaint when Whitby supposedly joined Plaintiffs' posited conspiracy,
and which plaintiff relied on any representation with which he might possibly be charged. No
3

03596

allegation is made of any representation actually made by him. As Whitby pointed out in
argument, he has factual defenses to make based on when he came to the company, so each
plaintiff needs to explain what representation they relied on as to which that they can properly
claim Whitby is accountable. But under the proposed Fifth Amended Complaint, he was at the
scene of the crime at some point in time, apparently, so he must be liable as well. Rule 9(b) is
essential in such a case; Whitby is entitled to the specifics of each plaintiff's claim against him,
without being lumped together with every other defendant, defending the lumped-together
claims of every plaintiff.
Defendants' Motion with respect to the First Cause of Action also illustrates the inadequacy of
the proposed Complaint. That motion articulates a complete defense to the Utah Securities Act
claim based on a statute of repose. It is made as a 12(b(6) claim, but is accompanied by an
affidavit establishing that each of the plaintiffs purchased their respective shares well outside
the statutory period. Plaintiffs objected to the consideration of that material outside the
pleadings. But the point is that the affidavit should not have been necessary-at a minimum,
Plaintiffs should have pleaded the dates on which they acquired their shares to establish when
they at least initially relied on Defendants' supposed misrepresentations.
The proposed Fifth Amended Complaint, at its core, alleges, for the most part, supposed
misrepresentations made by Defendant Rob Brazell to Plaintiff Steve Brazell, which plaintiffs
allege were passed along to all of them. A few other supposed misrepresentations are charged
to other defendants, though the pleading fai1s to reveal how these other statements of
presently existing fact were false at the time. But taking one example of an actual alleged
misrepresentation shows the weakness of the pleading: Plaintiffs allege that Rob Brazell
misrepresented his role at prior Overstock.com. In conclusory fashion, the pleading claims that
this representation was made to each of plaintiffs and relied on by each of them in investing in
In-Store Broadcasting Holding, Inc. Fifth Amended Complaint, 1128. Rob Brazell is entitled to a
pleading establishing at what time his brother, Steve Brazell, believed these representations,
and the manner in which he relied on them. He is entitled to require a pleading setting out the
same as to each of the proposed plaintiffs. And the same is true with respect to each
Defendant-after all, assuming Steve Brazell, (who under the proposed Complaint's allegations,
was intimately involved in the promotion of IBN) was duped by this supposed
misrepresentation, aren't the other defendants entitled to a pleading that explains how they ,
unlike Steve Brazell, knew it to be false?
This is more than an exercise in requiring plaintiffs to disclose their theory of fraud. By requiring
the "who, what, where, and how" of the alleged fraud, the Rules permit defendants in these
actions to formulate their defenses. With adequate particularity, defendants can match the
4
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supposed misrepresentations and allegations of reliance against the disclosures that were
made to the plaintiffs. In this case, plaintiffs attempt to allege that they received an interest
different than what they were told it was going to be. The obvious question that begs asking is
what did they receive at the time of purchase? Did subsequent disclosures bar contrary reliance
on previous statements of intent? What were the facts known at the time of reliance?
Conclusory allegations do not permit defendants to intelligently formulate these defenses.
At argument, Defendants repeatedly accused Plaintiffs of pursuing this claim as a means of
defaming Defendants, pointing to the website challenged in the counterclaim and its use of
materials from this litigation. Plaintiffs' motivation in bringing this suit, or one or more of them
publishing its details, plays no role in the Court's decision regarding the adequacy of the
pleadings here.1 But Defendants point does highlight the policy behind Rule 9(b); Fraud is a
serious matter. Because a charge of fraud has so much potential for the type of collateral
damage Defendants claim here, it is subject to heightened standards of pleading and proof.
Here, Plaintiffs fail the first hurdle of establishing this serious claim.
As Plaintiffs acknowledge, earlier versions of the Complaint are no better. The Court has

analyzed the proposed Fifth Amended Complaint as a logical first step in determining whether
to permit amendment. Plaintiffs have been candid that the Fifth Amended Complaint was
drafted in response to the Motion to Dismiss, and the Court concludes {having reviewed the
earlier versions of the complaint as well) it fails to cure the problems of pleading asserted in
that Motion. Accordingly, the Court grants the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, with prejudice.
Six tries at pleading fraud are enough. With discovery now at an end, Plaintiffs' inability to
plead with the required particularity does not justify permitting further attempts. This moots
the motion concerning the First Cause of Action being time-barred, though the Court
acknowledges that, assuming the factual predicates posed by Defendants, the arguments
concerning the statute of repose are wen-taken.
As to the remaining proposed new claims, Plaintiffs offer no justification for having brought
them at this late date, and Defendants would be prejudiced by now having to defend entirely
new claims at this late stage in the case's progress. The Court also notes that the new claims
lack necessary allegations for both the purported derivative claim and the receivership claim.
Accordingly, without regard to futility, the Court denies the Motion to Amend with respect to

1

Were the Court not satisfied that the amendment should be denied based on timeliness, lack of justlffcation,

substantial prejudice to the Defendants, and futility, the Court might be Inclined to consider the potential of
ulterior purposes for the pursuit of the lawsuit, as that, too, could Inform the decision whether to grant leave. Kelly
v. Hard Money Funding, 87 P.3d 734 at '1140. (Utah App. 2004).
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the new proposed Causes of Action as untimely, without justification and unduly prejudicial to
Defendants.

The Motion to Amend is denied. Plaintiffs' various Complaints, all of which lack the particularity
required under Rule 9, are dismissed with prejudice as to the moving defendants (IBN
Defendants and Whitby). The First Cause of Action is dismissed as to Defendant Riley on the
same basis. No further order is necessary.

DATED this

(f dayof

J1e.'""~. . y201s.
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ADDENDUMB

RULE 9. PLEADING SPECIAL MATTERS, UT R RCP Rule 9

!West's Utah Code Annotated
IState Court Rules
!Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs &Annos)
IPart III. Pleadings, Motions, and Orders
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 9
RULE 9. PLEADING SPECIAL MATTERS
Currentness

@

(a)(l) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be
sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party. A party
may raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the authority of a
party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity by specific negative averment, which shall include facts within the
pleader's knowledge. If raised as an issue, the party relying on such capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall establish the
same on the trial.

Gt,

(a)(2) Designation of unknown defendant. When a party does not know the name of an adverse party, he may state that fact in
the pleadings, and thereupon such adverse party may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name; provided,
that when the true name of such adverse party is ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly.

@

(a)(3) Actions to quiet title; description of interest of unknown parties. In an action to quiet title wherein any of the parties are
designated in the caption as "unknown," the pleadings may describe such unknown persons as "all other persons unknown,
claiming any right, title, estate or interest in, or lien upon the real property described in the pleading adverse to the
complainant's ownership, or clouding his title thereto."

(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred
generally.

(c) Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions precedent, it is sufficient to aver
generally that all conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or occurrence shall be
made specifically and with particularity, and when so made the party pleading the performance or occurrence shall on the
trial establish the facts showing such performance or occurrence.

(d) Official document or act. In pleading an official document or act it is sufficient to aver that the document was issued or
the act done in compliance with law.
V~'ESTLA\oV
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RULE 9. PLEADING SPECIAL MATTERS, UT R RCP Rule 9

(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi judicial tribunal, or of a
board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or decision without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it.
A denial of jurisdiction shall be made specifically and with particularity and when so made the party pleading the judgment
or decision shall establish on the trial all controverted jurisdictional facts.

(f) Time and place. For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, averments of time and place are material and
shall be considered like all other averments of material matter.

(g) Special damage. When items of special damage are claimed, they shall be specifically stated.

@

(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not necessary to state the facts showing the defense but it
may be alleged generally that the cause of action is barred by the provisions of the statute relied on, referring to or describing
such statute specifically and definitely by section number, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise designating the
provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such allegation is controverted, the party pleading the statute must
establish, on the trial, the facts showing that the cause of action is so barred.

(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this state, or an ordinance of any political subdivision
thereof, or a right derived from such statute or ordinance, it is sufficient to refer to such statute or ordinance by its title and
the day of its passage or by its section number or other designation in any official publication of the statutes or ordinances.
The court shall thereupon take judicial notice thereo£

®

(i}

(j) Libel and slander.

(j)( I) Pleading defamato,y matter. It is not necessary in an action for libel or slander to set forth any intrinsic facts showing
the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter out of which the action arose; but it is sufficient to state generally that
the same was published or spoken concerning the plaintiff. If such allegation is controverted, the party alleging such
defamatory matter must establish, on the trial, that it was so published or spoken.

(j)(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an action for libel or slander, the defendant may allege both the truth of the matter
charged as defamatory and any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damages, and, whether he proves the
justification or not, he may give in evidence the mitigating circumstances.

(k) Renew judgment. A complaint alleging failure to pay a judgment shall describe the judgment with particularity or attach
a copy of the judgment to the complaint.

W'EST'LAV1/
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RULE 9. PLEADING SPECIAL MATTERS, UT R RCP Rule 9

i}

(l) Allocation of fault.

(1)(1) A party seeking to allocate fault to a non-party under Title 78B, Chapter 5, Part 8 shall file:

@

(1)(1 ){A) a description of the factual and legal basis on which fault can be allocated; and

(l)(l){B) information known or reasonably available to the party identifying the non-party, including name, address,
telephone number and employer. If the identity of the non-party is unknown, the party shall so state.

(1)(2) The information specified in subsection (I)( 1) must be included in the party's responsive pleading if then known or
must be included in a supplemental notice filed within a reasonable time after the party discovers the factual and legal basis
on which fault can be allocated. The court, upon motion and for good cause shown, may permit a party to file the information
specified in subsection (1)(1) after the expiration of any period permitted by this rule, but in no event later than 90 days before
trial.

(1)(3) A party may not seek to allocate fault to another except by compliance with this rule.

Credits
[Amended effective November 1, 2003; May 2, 2005; November 1, 2008; November 1, 2011.]

Notes of Decisions (109)

Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 9, UT R RCP Rule 9
current with amendments received through February 1, 2016.
End of Document
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RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS, UT R RCP Rule 15

IWest's Utah Code Annotated
IState Court Rules
IUtah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos)
IPart III. Pleadings, Motions, and Orders
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15
RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
Currentness

(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is
served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial
calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 21 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party
shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 14
days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.

(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion
of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party
fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon
the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.

(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back
to the date of the original pleading.

(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just,
permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since
the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is defective
in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental
pleading, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor.

@

Credits

@

(Amended effective May 1, 2014.]
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Notes of Decisions (515)

Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 15, UT RRCP Rule 15
current with amendments received through February 1, 2016.
End of Document
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RULE 26. GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCLOSURE ... , UT R RCP Rule 26

!West's Utah Code Annotated
IState Court Rules
IUtah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos)
IPart V. Depositions and Discovery
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26
RULE 26. GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCLOSURE AND DISCOVERY
Currentness

(a) Disclosure. This rule applies unless changed or supplemented by a rule governing disclosure and discovery in a practice
area.

(a)(l) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under paragraph (a)(3), a party shall, without waiting for a discovery
request, serve on the other parties:

(a)(l)(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of:

(a)(l )(A)(i) each individual likely to have discoverable information supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for
impeachment, identifying the subjects of the information; and

(a)(l)(A)(ii) each fact witness the party may call in its case-in-chief and, except for an adverse party, a summary of the
expected testimony;

(a)(l)(B) a copy of all documents, data compilations, electronically stored information, and tangible things in the possession
or control of the party that the party may offer in its case-in-chief, except charts, summaries and demonstrative exhibits that
have not yet been prepared and must be disclosed in accordance with paragraph (a)(5);

WESTLAW
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RULE 26. GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCLOSURE ... , UT R RCP Rule 26

(a)(l)(C) a computation of any damages claimed and a copy of all discoverable documents or evidentiary material on which
such computation is based, including materials about the nature and extent of injuries suffered;

(a)(l)(D) a copy of any agreement under which any person may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment or to indemnify
or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment; and

(a){l)(E) a copy of all documents to which a party refers in its pleadings.

(a)(2) Timing ofinitial disclosures. The disclosures required by paragraph (a){l) shall be served on the other parties:

(a)(2)(A) by the plaintiff within 14 days after filing of the first answer to the complaint; and

(a)(2){B) by the defendant within 42 days after filing of the first answer to the complaint or within 28 days after that
defendant's appearance, whichever is later.

(a)(3) Exemptions.

(a)(3)(A) Unless otherwise ordered by the court or agreed to by the parties, the requirements of paragraph (a){l) do not apply
to actions:

(a)(3)(A)(i) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule making proceedings of an administrative agency;
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(a)(3)(A)(ii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C;

(a)(3)(A)(iii) to enforce an arbitration award;

(a)(3)(A)(iv) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, Chapter 4, Determination of Water Rights.

(a)(3)(B) In an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under paragraph (a){l) are subject to discovery under
paragraph (b ).

(a)(4) Expert testimony.

(a)(4)(A) Disclosure of expert testimony. A party shall, without waiting for a discovery request, serve on the other parties the
following information regarding any person who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence and who is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee
of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony: (i) the expert's name and qualifications, including a list of all
publications authored within the preceding IO years, and a list of any other cases in which the expert has testified as an expert
at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years, (ii) a brief summary of the opinions to which the witness is expected
to testify, (iii) all data and other information that will be relied upon by the witness in forming those opinions, and (iv) the
compensation to be paid for the witness's study and testimony.

(a)(4)(B) Limits on expert discovery. Further discovery may be obtained from an expert witness either by deposition or by
written report. A deposition shaJI not exceed four hours and the party taking the deposition shall pay the expert's reasonable
hourly fees for attendance at the deposition. A report shall be signed by the expert and shall contain a complete statement of
all opinions the expert will offer at trial and the basis and reasons for them. Such an expert may not testify in a party's
case-in-chief concerning any matter not fairly disclosed in the report. The party offering the expert shall pay the costs for the
report.

(a)(4)(C) Timing for expert discovery.
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(a)(4)(C)(i) The party who bears the burden of proof on the issue for which expert testimony is offered shall serve on the
other parties the information required by paragraph (a)(4)(A) within seven days after the close of fact discovery. Within
seven days thereafter, the party opposing the expert may serve notice electing either a deposition of the expert pursuant to
paragraph (a)(4)(B) and Rule 30, or a written report pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B). The deposition shall occur, or the report
shall be served on the other parties, within 28 days after the election is served on the other parties. If no election is served on
the other parties, then no further discovery of the expert shall be permitted.

(a)(4)(C)(ii) The party who does not bear the burden of proof on the issue for which expert testimony is offered shall serve on
the other parties the information required by paragraph (a)(4)(A) within seven days after the later of (A) the date on which the
election under paragraph (a)(4)(C)(i) is due, or (B) receipt of the written report or the taking of the expert's deposition
pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(C)(i). Within seven days thereafter, the party opposing the expert may serve notice electing
either a deposition of the expert pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B) and Rule 30, or a written report pursuant to paragraph
(a)(4)(B). The deposition shall occur, or the report shall be served on the other parties, within 28 days after the election is
served on the other parties. If no election is served on the other parties, then no further discovery of the expert shall be
permitted.

(a)(4)(C)(iii) If the party who bears the burden of proof on an issue wants to designate rebuttal expert witnesses it shall serve
on the other parties the information required by paragraph (a)(4)(A) within seven days after the later of (A) the date on which
the election under paragraph (a)(4)(C)(ii) is due, or (B) receipt of the written report or the taking of the expert's deposition
pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(C)(ii). Within seven days thereafter, the party opposing the expert may serve notice electing
either a deposition of the expert pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B) and Rule 30, or a written report pursuant to paragraph
(a)(4)(B). The deposition shall occur, or the report shall be served on the other parties, within 28 days after the election is
served on the other parties. If no election is served on the other parties, then no further discovery of the expert shall be
permitted.

(a)(4)(D) Multiparty actions. In multiparty actions, all parties opposing the expert must agree on either a report or a
deposition. If all parties opposing the expert do not agree, then further discovery of the expert may be obtained only by
deposition pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B) and Rule 30.

(a)(4)(E) Summary of non-retained expert testimony. If a party intends to present evidence at trial under Rule 702 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence from any person other than an expert witness who is retained or specially employed to provide testimony
in the case or a person whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, that party must
serve on the other parties a written summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify in
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accordance with the deadlines set forth in paragraph (a)(4)(C). A deposition of such a witness may not exceed four hours.

(a)(5) Pretrial disclosures.

(a)(5){A) A party shall, without waiting for a discovery request, serve on the other parties:

(a)(5)(A)(i) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and telephone number of each witness, unless solely for
impeachment, separately identifying witnesses the party will call and witnesses the party may call;

(a)(5)(A)(ii) the name of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be presented by transcript of a deposition and a copy of
the transcript with the proposed testimony designated; and

(a)(5)(A)(iii) a copy of each exhibit, including charts, summaries and demonstrative exhibits, unless solely for impeachment,
separately identifying those which the party will offer and those which the party may offer.

(a){5)(B) Disclosure required by paragraph (a)(5) shall be served on the other parties at least 28 days before trial. At least 14
days before trial, a party shall serve and file counter designations of deposition testimony, objections and grounds for the
objections to the use of a deposition and to the admissibility of exhibits. Other than objections under Rules 402 and 403 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence, objections not listed are waived unless excused by the court for good cause.

(b) Discovery scope.

(b)(I) In general. Parties may discover any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the claim or defense of any party if the
discovery satisfies the standards of proportionality set forth below. Privileged matters that are not discoverable or admissible
in any proceeding of any kind or character include all information in any form provided during and created specifically as
part of a request for an investigation, the investigation, findings, or conclusions of peer review, care review, or quality
W1ESTUWV
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assurance processes of any organization of health care providers as defined in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act for the
purpose of evaluating care provided to reduce morbidity and mortality or to improve the quality of medical care, or for the
purpose of peer review of the ethics, competence, or professional conduct of any health care provider.

(b)(2) Proportionality. Discovery and discovery requests are proportional if:

(b )(2)(A) the discovery is reasonable, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the complexity of the
case, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues;

(b)(2)(8) the likely benefits of the proposed discovery outweigh the burden or expense;

(b)(2)(C) the discovery is consistent with the overall case management and will further the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of the case;

(b )(2)(D) the discovery is not unreasonably cumulative or duplicative;

(b )(2)(E) the information cannot be obtained from another source that is more convenient, less burdensome or less expensive;
and

(b )(2)(F) the party seeking discovery has not had sufficient opportunity to obtain the information by discovery or otherwise,
taking into account the parties' relative access to the information.

(b)(3) Burden. The party seeking discovery always has the burden of showing proportionality and relevance. To ensure
proportionality, the court may enter orders under Rule 3 7.
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(b)(4) Electronically stored information. A party claiming that electronically stored information is not reasonably accessible
because of undue burden or cost shall describe the source of the electronically stored information, the nature and extent of the
burden, the nature of the information not provided, and any other information that will enable other parties to evaluate the
claim.

@

(b)(5) Trial preparation materials. A party may obtain otherwise discoverable documents and tangible things prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including the party's
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has
substantial need of the materials and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain substantially equivalent
materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party.

@

(b)(6) Statement previously made about the action. A party may obtain without the showing required in paragraph (b)(5) a
statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that party. Upon request, a person not a party may
obtain without the required showing a statement about the action or its subject matter previously made by that person. If the
request is refused, the person may move for a court order under Rule 37. A statement previously made is (A) a written
statement signed or approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electronic, or other recording, or a
transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person making it and
contemporaneously recorded.

(b)(7) Trial preparation; experts.

(b )(7)(A) Trial-preparation protection for draft reports or disclosures. Paragraph (b )(5) protects drafts of any report or
disclosure required under paragraph (a)(4), regardless of the form in which the draft is recorded.

(b)(7)(B) Trial-preparation protection for communications between a party's attorney and expert witnesses. Paragraph (b)(5)
protects communications between the party's attorney and any witness required to provide disclosures under paragraph
(a)(4), regardless of the form of the communications, except to the extent that the communications:

(b )(7)(B)(i) relate to compensation for the expert's study or testimony;
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(b)(7)(B)(ii) identify facts or data that the party's attorney provided and that the expert considered in forming the opinions to
be expressed; or

(b)(7)(B)(iii) identify assumptions that the party's attorney provided and that the expert relied on in forming the opinions to
be expressed.

(b)(7)(C) Expert employed only for trial preparation. Ordinarily, a party may not, by interrogatories or otherwise, discover
facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of
litigation or to prepare for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial. A party may do so only:

(b)(7)(C)(i) as provided in Rule 35(b); or

@

(b)(7)(C)(ii) on showing exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party to obtain facts or opinions on
the same subject by other means.

(b )(8) Claims ofprivilege or protection of trial preparation materials.

(b )(8)(A} Information withheld. If a party withholds discoverable information by claiming that it is privileged or prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the documents,
communications, or things not produced in a manner that, without revealing the information itself, will enable other parties to
evaluate the claim.

(b)(8)(B) Information produced. If a party produces information that the party claims is privileged or prepared in anticipation
of litigation or for trial, the producing party may notify any receiving party of the claim and the basis for it. After being
notified, a receiving party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies it has and may
not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved. A receiving party may promptly present the information to the
court under seal for a determination of the claim. If the receiving party disclosed the information before being notified, it
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must take reasonable steps to retrieve it. The producing party must preserve the infonnation until the claim is resolved.

(c) Methods, sequence and timing of discovery; tiers; limits on standard discovery; extraordinary discovery.

(c)(1) Methods of discove,y. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following methods: depositions upon oral
examination or written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or pennission to enter upon land
or other property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental examinations; requests for admission; and
subpoenas other than for a court hearing or trial.

(c)(2) Sequence and timing of discove,y. Methods of discovery may be used in any sequence, and the fact that a party is
conducting discovery shall not delay any other party's discovery. Except for cases exempt under paragraph (a)(3), a party
may not seek discovery from any source before that party's initial disclosure obligations are satisfied.

@

(c)(3) Definition of tiers for standard discovery. Actions claiming $50,000 or less in damages are pennitted standard
discovery as described for Tier I. Actions claiming more than $50,000 and less than $300,000 in damages are pennitted
standard discovery as described for Tier 2. Actions claiming $300,000 or more in damages are pennitted standard discovery
as described for Tier 3. Absent an accompanying damage claim for more than $300,000, actions claiming non-monetary
relief are pennitted standard discovery as described for Tier 2.

(c)(4) Definition of damages. For purposes of detennining standard discovery, the amount of damages includes the total of al1
monetary damages sought (without duplication for alternative theories) by all parties in all claims for relief in the original
pleadings.

(c)(5) Limits on standard fact discove1y. Standard fact discovery per side (plaintiffs collectively, defendants collectively, and
third-party defendants collectively) in each tier is as follows. The days to complete standard fact discovery are calculated
from the date the first defendant's first disclosure is due and do not include expert discovery under paragraphs(a)(4)(C) and
(D).

T
i

Rule 34
Requests for
Production

Rule36
Requests for
Admission

Days to
Complete
Standard
Fact
Discovery

Amount of
Damages

Total Fact
Deposition
Hours

Rule 33
Interrogatories
including all discrete
subparts

$50,000 or less

3

0

5

5

120

15

10

10

10

180

e

More than
$50,000 and less
than $300,000 or
non-monetary
relief ----· ·-·· ··----- •·---·- - -•---·- ·-··-~-•·----·
2
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··------.
3

---

-

·•------·•---------- -- --$300,000 or more

30

20

20

20

210

(c)(6) Extraordina,y discove,y. To obtain discovery beyond the limits established in paragraph (c)(S), a party shall file:

(c)( 6)(A) before the close of standard discovery and after reaching the limits of standard discovery imposed by these rules, a
stipulated statement that extraordinary discovery is necessary and proportional under paragraph (b )(2) and that each party has
reviewed and approved a discovery budget; or

(c)(6)(B) before the close of standard discovery and after reaching the limits of standard discovery imposed by these rules, a
request for extraordinary discovery under Rule 37(a).

(d) Requirements for disclosure or response; disclosure or response by an organization; failure to disclose; initial and
supplemental disclosures and responses.

(d)( 1) A party shall make disclosures and responses to discovery based on the information then known or reasonably
available to the party.

(d)(2) If the party providing disclosure or responding to discovery is a corporation, partnership, association, or governmental
agency, the party shall act through one or more officers, directors, managing agents, or other persons, who shall make
disclosures and responses to discovery based on the information then known or reasonably available to the party.

(d)(3) A party is not excused from making disclosures or responses because the party has not completed investigating the
case or because the party challenges the sufficiency of another party's disclosures or responses or because another party has
not made disclosures or responses.

@

(d)(4) If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely a disclosure or response to discovery, that party may not use the
undisclosed witness, document or material at any hearing or trial unless the failure is harmless or the party shows good cause
for the failure.
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(d)(5) If a party learns that a disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect in some important way, the party must timely
serve on the other parties the additional or correct information if it has not been made known to the other parties. The
supplemental disclosure or response must state why the additional or correct information was not previously provided.

(e) Signing discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every disclosure, request for discovery, response to a request
for discovery and objection to a request for discovery shall be in writing and signed by at least one attorney of record or by
the party if the party is not represented. The signature of the attorney or party is a certification under Rule 11. If a request or
response is not signed, the receiving party does not need to take any action with respect to it. If a certification is made in
violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may take any action authorized by Rule 11 or Rule
37(b).

(t) Filing. Except as required by these rules or ordered by the court, a party shall not file with the court a disclosure, a request
for discovery or a response to a request for discovery, but shall file only the certificate of service stating that the disclosure,
request for discovery or response has been served on the other parties and the date of service.

Credits
[Effective May 2, 2005; amended effective November 1, 2007; November I, 2008; November I, 201 I; March 6, 2012; April
1, 2013; May 1, 2015.]

Editors' Notes
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES

Disclosure requirements and timing. Rule 26(a)(l). The 2011 amendments seek to reduce discovery costs by requiring
each party to produce, at an early stage in the case, and without a discovery request, all of the documents and physical
evidence the party may offer in its case-in-chief and the names of witnesses the party may call in its case-in-chief, with a
description of their expected testimony. In this respect, the amendments build on the initial disclosure requirements of the
prior rules. In addition to the disclosures required by the prior version of Rule 26(a)(l), a party must disclose each fact
witness the party may call in its case-in-chief and a summary of the witness's expected testimony, a copy of all documents
the party may offer in its case-in-chief, and all documents to which a party refers in its pleadings.

Not all information will be known at the outset of a case. If discovery is serving its proper purpose, additional witnesses,
documents, and other information will be identified. The scope and the level of detail required in the initial Rule 26(a)(l)
disclosures should be viewed in light of this reality. A party is not required to interview every witness it ultimately may call
at trial in order to provide a summary of the witness's expected testimony. As the infonnation becomes known, it should be
disclosed. No summaries are required for adverse parties, including management level employees of business entities,
because opposing lawyers are unable to interview them and their testimony is available to their own counsel. For
uncooperative or hostile witnesses any summary of expected testimony would necessarily be limited to the subject areas the
witness is reasonably expected to testify about. For example, defense counsel may be unable to interview a treating
physician, so the initial summary may only disclose that the witness will be questioned concerning the plaintiffs diagnosis,
treatment and prognosis. After medical records have been obtained, the summary may be expanded or refined.
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Subject to the foregoing qualifications, the summary of the witness's expected testimony should be just that--a summary. The
rule does not require prefiled testimony or detailed descriptions of everything a witness might say at trial. On the other hand,
it requires more than the broad, conclusory statements that often were made under the prior version of Rule 26(a)(l)(e.g.,
"The witness will testify about the events in question" or "The witness will testify on causation."). The intent of this
requirement is to give the other side basic information concerning the subjects about which the witness is expected to testify
at trial, so that the other side may determine the witness's relative importance in the case, whether the witness should be
interviewed or deposed, and whether additional documents or information concerning the witness should be sought. This
information is important because of the other discovery limits contained in the 2011 amendments, particularly the limits on
depositions.

Likewise, the documents that should be provided as part of the Rule 26(a)(l) disclosures are those that a party reasonably
believes it may use at trial, understanding that not all documents will be available at the outset of a case. In this regard, it is
important to remember that the duty to provide documents and witness information is a continuing one, and disclosures must
be promptly supplemented as new evidence and witnesses become known as the case progresses.

The amendments also require parties to provide more information about damages early in the case. Too often, the subject of
damages is deferred until late in the case. Early disclosure of damages information is important. Among other things, it is a
critical factor in determining proportionality. The committee recognizes that damages often require additional discovery, and
typically are the subject of expert testimony. The Rule is not intended to require expert disclosures at the outset of a case. At
the same time, the subject of damages should not simply be deferred until expert discovery. Parties should make a good faith
attempt to compute damages to the extent it is possible to do so and must in any event provide all discoverable information
on the subject, including materials related to the nature and extent of the damages.

The penalty for failing to make timely disclosures is that the evidence may not be used in the party's case-in-chief. To make
the disclosure requirement meaningful, and to discourage sandbagging, parties must know that if they fail to disclose
important information that is helpful to their case, they will not be able to use that information at trial. The courts will be
expected to enforce them unless the failure is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure.

The 2011 amendments also change the time for making these required disclosures. Because the plaintiff controls when it
brings the action, plaintiffs must make their disclosures within 14 days after service of the first answer. A defendant is
required to make its disclosures within 28 days after the plaintiff's first disclosure or after that defendant's appearance,
whichever is later. The purpose of early disclosure is to have all parties present the evidence they expect to use to prove their
claims or defenses, thereby giving the opposing party the ability to better evaluate the case and determine what additional
discovery is necessary and proportional.

The time periods for making Rule 26(a)(l) disclosures, and the presumptive deadlines for completing fact discovery, are
keyed to the filing of an answer. If a defendant files a motion to dismiss or other Rule l 2(b) motion in lieu of an answer,
these time periods normally would be not begin to run until that motion is resolved.

Finally, the 2011 amendments eliminate two categories of actions that previously were exempt from the mandatory
disclosure requirements. Specifically, the amendments eliminate the prior exemption for contract actions in which the amount
claimed is $20,000 or less, and actions in which any party is proceeding pro se. In the committee's view, these types of
actions will benefit from the early disclosure requirements and the overall reduced cost of discovery.

Expert disclosures and timing. Rule 26(a)(3). Expert discovery has become an ever-increasing component of discovery
cost. The prior rules sought to eliminate some of these costs by requiring the written disclosure of the expert's opinions and
other background information. However, because the expert was not required to sign these disclosures, and because experts
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often were allowed to deviate from the opinions disclosed, attorneys typicaJly would take the expert's deposition to ensure
the expert would not offer "surprise" testimony at trial, thereby increasing rather than decreasing the overall cost. The
amendments seek to remedy this and other costs associated with expert discovery by, among other things, allowing the
opponent to choose either a deposition of the expert or a written report, but not both; in the case of written reports, requiring
more comprehensive disclosures, signed by the expert, and making clear that experts will not be allowed to testify beyond
what is fairly disclosed in a report, all with the goal of making reports a reliable substitute for depositions; and incorporating
a rule that protects from discovery most communications between an attorney and retained expert. Discovery of expert
opinions and testimony is automatic under Rule 26(a)(3) and parties are not required to serve interrogatories or use other
discovery devices to obtain this information.

Disclosures of expert testimony are made in sequence, with the party who bears the burden of proof on the issue for which
expert testimony will be offered going first. Within seven days after the close of fact discovery, that party must disclose: (i)
the expert's curriculum vitae identifying the expert's qualifications, publications, and prior testimony; (ii) compensation
information; (iii) a brief summary of the opinions the expert will offer; and (iv) a complete copy of the expert's file for the
case. The file should include all of the facts and data that the expert has relied upon in fonning the expert's opinions. If the
expert has prepared summaries of data, spreadsheets, charts, tables, or similar materials, they should be included. If the expert
has used software programs to make calculations or otherwise summarize or organize data, that information and underlying
formulas should be provided in native form so it can be analyzed and understood. To the extent the expert is relying on
depositions or materials produced in discovery, then a list of the specific materials relied upon is sufficient. The committee
recognizes that experts frequently will prepare demonstrative exhibits or other aids to illustrate the expert's testimony at trial,
and the costs for preparing these materials can be substantial. For that reason, these types of demonstrative aids may be
prepared and disclosed later, as part of the Rule 26(a)(4) pretrial disclosures when trial is imminent.

Within seven days after this disclosure, the party opposing the retained expert may elect either a deposition or a written report
from the expert. A deposition is limited to four hours, which is not included in the deposition hours under Rule 26(c)(5), and
the party taking it must pay the expert's hourly fee for attending the deposition. If a party elects a written report, the expert
must provide a signed report containing a complete statement of all opinions the expert will express and the basis and reasons
for them. The intent is not to require a verbatim transcript of exactly what the expert will say at trial; instead the expert must
fairly disclose the substance of and basis for each opinion the expert will offer. The expert may not testify in a party's case in
chief concerning any matter that is not fairly disclosed in the report. To achieve the goal of making reports a reliable
substitute for depositions, courts are expected to enforce this requirement. If a party elects a deposition, rather than a report, it
is up to the party to ask the necessary questions to "lock in" the expert's testimony. But the expert is expected to be fully
prepared on all aspects of his/her trial testimony at the time of the deposition and may not leave the door open for additional
testimony by qualifying answers to deposition questions.

The report or deposition must be completed within 28 days after the election is made. After this, the party who does not bear
the burden of proof on the issue for which expert testimony is offered must make its corresponding disclosures and the
opposing party may then elect either a deposition or a written report. Under the deadlines contained in the rules, expert
discovery should take less than three months to complete. However, as with the other discovery rules, these deadlines can be
altered by stipulation of the parties or order of the court.

The amendments also address the issue of testimony from non-retained experts, such as treating physicians, police officers, or
employees with special expertise, who are not retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony, or whose duties as
an employee do not regularly involve giving expert testimony. This issue was addressed by the Supreme Court in Drew v.
Lee, 2011 UT 15, wherein the court held that reports under the prior version of Rule 26(a)(3) are not required for treating
physicians.

There are a number of difficulties inherent in disclosing expert testimony that may be offered from fact witnesses. First, there
is often not a clear line between fact and expert testimony. Many fact witnesses have scientific, technical or other specialized
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knowledge, and their testimony about the events in question often will cross into the area of expert testimony. The rules are
not intended to erect artificial barriers to the admissibility of such testimony. Second, many of these fact witnesses will not be
within the control of the party who plans to call them at trial. These witnesses may not be cooperative, and may not be
willing to discuss opinions they have with counsel. Where this is the case, disclosures will necessarily be more limited. On
the other hand, consistent with the overall purpose of the 2011 amendments, a party should receive advance notice if their
opponent will solicit expert opinions from a particular witness so they can plan their case accordingly. In an effort to strike an
appropriate balance, the rules require that such witnesses be identified and the information about their anticipated testimony
should include that which is required under Rule 26(a)(l )(A)(ii), which should include any opinion testimony that a party
expects to elicit from them at trial. If a party has disclosed possible opinion testimony in its Rule 26(a)(l)(A)(ii) disclosures,
that party is not required to prepare a separate Rule 26(a)(4)(E) disclosure for the witness. And if that disclosure is made in
advance of the witness's deposition, those opinions should be explored in the deposition and not in a separate expert
deposition. Otherwise, the timing for disclosure e of non-retained expert opinions is the same as that for retained experts
under Rule 26(a)(4)(C) and depends on whether the party has the burden of proof or is responding to another expert. Rules
26(a)(4)(E) and 26(a)(l)(A)(ii) are not intended to elevate form over substance--all they require is that a party fairly inform
its opponent that opinion testimony may be offered from a particular witness. And because a party who expects to offer this
testimony normally cannot compel such a witness to prepare a written report, further discovery must be done by interview or
by deposition.

Finally, the amendments include a new Rule 26(b)(7) that protects from discovery draft expert reports and, with limited
exception, communications between an attorney and an expert. These changes are modeled after the recent changes to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are intended to address the unnecessary and costly procedures that often were employed
in order to protect such information from discovery, and to reduce "satellite litigation" over such issues.

Scope of discovery--Proportionality. Rule 26(b). Proportionality is the principle governing the scope of discovery. Simply
stated, it means that the cost of discovery should be proportional to what is at stake in the litigation.

In the past, the scope of discovery was governed by "relevance" or the "likelihood to lead to discovery of admissible
evidence." These broad standards may have secured just results by allowing a party to discover all facts relevant to the
litigation. However, they did little to advance two equally important objectives of the rules of civil procedure--the speedy and
inexpensive resolution of every action. Accordingly, the former standards governing the scope of discovery have been
replaced with the proportionality standards in subpart (b )( 1).

The concept of proportionality is not new. The prior rule permitted the Court to limit discovery methods if it determined that
"the discovery was unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy,
limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation." The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure contains a similar provision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). This method of limiting discovery, however, was
rarely invoked either under the Utah rules or federal rules.

Under the prior rule, the party objecting to the discovery request had the burden of proving that a discovery request was not
proportional. The new rule changes the burden of proof. Today, the party seeking discovery beyond the scope of "standard"
discovery has the burden of showing that the request is "relevant to the claim or defense of any party" and that the request
satisfies the standards of proportionality. As before, ultimate admissibility is not an appropriate objection to a discovery
request so long as the proportionality standard and other requirements are met.

The 2011 amendments establish three tiers of standard discovery in Rule 26(c). Ideally, rules of procedure should be crafted
to promote predictability for litigants. Rules should limit the need to resort to judicial oversight. Tiered standard discovery
seeks to achieve these ends. The "one-size-fits-all" system is rejected. Tiered discovery signals to judges, attorneys, and
parties the amount of discovery which by rule is deemed proportional for cases with different amounts in controversy.
V~ESTLAW
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Any system of rules which permits the facts and circumstances of each case to inform procedure cannot eliminate
uncertainty. Ultimately, the trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether a discovery request is proportional. The
proportionality standards in subpart (b)(2) and the discovery tiers in subpart (c) mitigate uncertainty by guiding that
discretion. The proper application of the proportionality standards will be defined over time by trial and appellate courts.

Standard and extraordinary discovery. Rule 26(c). As a counterpart to requiring more detailed disclosures under Rule
26(a), the 2011 amendments place new limitations on additional discovery the parties may conduct. Because the committee
expects the enhanced disclosure requirements will automatically permit each party to learn the witnesses and evidence the
opposing side will offer in its case-in-chief, additional discovery should serve the more limited function of permitting parties
to find witnesses, documents, and other evidentiary materials that are harmful, rather than helpful, to the opponent's case.

Rule 26(c) provides for three separate "tiers" of limited, "standard" discovery that are presumed to be proportional to the
amount and issues in controversy in the action, and that the parties may conduct as a matter of right. An aggregation of all
damages sought by all parties in an action dictates the applicable tier of standard discovery, whether such damages are sought
by way of a complaint, counterclaim, or otherwise. The tiers of standard discovery are set forth in a chart that is embedded in
the body of the rule itself. "Tier l" describes a minimal amount of standard discovery that is presumed proportional for cases
involving damages of $50,000 or less. "Tier 2" sets forth larger limits on standard discovery that are applicable in cases
involving damages above $50,000 but less than $300,000. Finally, "Tier 3" prescribes still greater standard discovery for
actions involving damages in excess of $300,000. Deposition hours are charged to a side for the time spent asking questions
of the witness. In a particular deposition, one side may use two hours while the other side uses only 30 minutes. The tiers also
provide presumptive limitations on the time within which standard discovery should be completed, which limitations
similarly increase with the amount of damages at issue. A statement of discovery issues will not toll the period. Parties are
expected to be reasonable and accomplish as much as they can during standard discovery. A statement of discovery issues
may result in additional discovery and sanctions at the expense of a party who unreasonably fails to respond or otherwise
frustrates discovery. After the expiration of the applicable time limitation, a case is presumed to be ready for trial. Actions for
non-monetary relief, such as injunctive relief, are subject to the standard discovery limitations of Tier 2, absent an
accompanying monetary claim of $300,000 or more, in which case Tier 3 applies. The committee determined these standard
discovery limitations based on the expectation that for the majority of cases filed in the Utah State Courts, the magnitude of
available discovery and applicable time parameters available under the three-tiered system should be sufficient for cases
involving the respective amounts of damages.

Despite the expectation that standard discovery according to the applicable tier should be adequate in the typical case, the
2011 amendments contemplate there will be some cases for which standard discovery is not sufficient or appropriate. In such
cases, parties may conduct additional discovery that is shown to be consistent with the principle of proportionality. There are
two ways to obtain such additional discovery. The first is by stipulation. If the parties can agree additional discovery is
necessary, they may stipulate to as much additional discovery as they desire, provided they stipulate the additional discovery
is proportional to what is at stake in the litigation and counsel for each party certifies that the party has reviewed and
approved a budget for additional discovery. Such a stipulation should be filed before the close of the standard discovery time
limit, but only after reaching the limits for that type of standard discovery available under the rule. If these conditions are
met, the Court will not second-guess the parties and their counsel and must approve the stipulation.

The second method to obtain additional discovery is by a statement of discovery issues. The committee recognizes there will
be some cases in which additional discovery is appropriate, but the parties cannot agree to the scope of such additional
discovery. These may include, among other categories, large and factually complex cases and cases in which there is a
significant disparity in the parties' access to information, such that one party legitimately has a greater need than the other
party for additional discovery in order to prepare properly for trial. To prevent a party from taking advantage of this situation,
the 2011 amendments allow any party to request additional discovery. As with stipulations for extraordinary discovery, a
party requesting extraordinary discovery should do so before the close of the standard discovery time limit, but only after the
VlESHAV-.'
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party has reached the limits for that type of standard discovery available to it under the rule. By taking advantage of this
discovery, counsel should be better equipped to articulate for the court what additional discovery is needed and why. The
requesting party must demonstrate that the additional discovery is proportional and certify that the party has reviewed and
approved a discovery budget. The burden to show the need for additional discovery, and to demonstrate relevance and
proportionality, always falls on the party seeking additional discovery. However, cases in which such additional discovery is
appropriate dq exist, and it is important for courts to recognize they can and should permit additional discovery in appropriate
cases, commensurate with the complexity and magnitude of the dispute.

Protective order language moved to Rule 37. The 2011 amendments delete in its entirety the prior language of Rule 26(c)
governing motions for protective orders. The substance of that language is now found in Rule 37. The committee determined
it was preferable to cover requests for an order to compel, for a protective order, and sanctions in a single rule, rather than
two separate rules.

Consequences of failure to disclose. Rule 26(d). If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely its discovery responses,
that party cannot use the undisclosed witness, document, or material at any hearing or trial, absent proof that non-disclosure
was harmless or justified by good cause. More complete disclosures increase the likelihood that the case will be resolved
justly, speedily, and inexpensively. Not being able to use evidence that a party fails properly to disclose provides a powerful
incentive to make complete disclosures. This is true only if trial courts hold parties to this standard. Accordingly, although a
trial court retains discretion to determine how properly to address this issue in a given case, the usual and expected result
should be exclusion of the evidence.

LEGISLATIVE NOTE

( 1) The amended language in paragraph (b )( 1) is intended to incorporate long-standing protections against discovery and
admission into evidence of privileged matters connected to medical care review and peer review into the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. These privileges, found in both Utah common law and statute, include Sections 26-25-3, 58-13-4, and 58-13-5,
UCA, 1953. The language is intended to ensure the confidentiality of peer review, care review, and quality assurance
processes and to ensure that the privilege is limited only to documents and information created specifically as part of the
processes. It does not extend to knowledge gained or documents created outside or independent of the processes. The
language is not intended to limit the court's existing ability, if it chooses, to review contested documents in camera in order
to determine whether the documents fall within the privilege. The language is not intended to alter any existing law, rule, or
regulation relating to the confidentiality, admissibility, or disclosure of proceedings before the Utah Division of Occupational
and Professional Licensing. The Legislature intends that these privileges apply to all pending and future proceedings
governed by court rules, including administrative proceedings regarding licensing and reimbursement.

(2) The Legislature does not intend that the amendments to this rule be construed to change or alter a final order concerning
discovery matters entered on or before the effective date of this amendment.

@

(3) The Legislature intends to give the greatest effect to its amendment, as legally permissible, in matters that are pending on
or may arise after the effective date of this amendment, without regard to when the case was filed.

Notes of Decisions (206)

Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 26, UT R RCP Rule 26
current with amendments received through February 1, 2016.
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